Themed seminar on Time and the Self
Starts:
Finishes:
Venue:
Birkbeck 30 Russell Square
No booking required
Our 'Themed Seminar' is a fortnightly research seminar that meets in the afternoons of the same Thursdays as the ‘Work In Progress’ seminar. It is led by a member of the philosophy academic staff, or by a departmental research fellow, on a theme in their area of expertise. The seminar meets in Room 501, 30 Russell Square.
In Spring Term 2026, the seminar will be led by Peter Jackson, on the theme of ‘Time and Mind in a Local Holism’, as follows.
TIME AND THE SELF
Summary According to the most convincing account of the metaphysics of time, time does not pass. This is to say that, according to this account, events do not change from being future, to being present, to being past in any metaphysically real sense. Indeed, according to this account, futurity, presentness and pastness are notions of no metaphysical standing at all, being merely useful illusions which help us to find our way through the world.
Conversely, the most convincing accounts of persons, and of perception, presuppose, it will be argued, that time doespass, and that futurity, presentness and pastness are metaphysically real. These themed seminars will seek to square this circle. This will involve the claim that the time-does-not-pass account of time, though robust on its own terms, is leaving something out. And what it is leaving out is the role of consciousness – in particular, the impact that consciousness, when characterised in certain ways, has on how time is. The metaphysics of time, this is to say, is conditioned by the metaphysics of mind. Time and mind are, therefore, inter-defined. Time and mind form a local holism.
1 Time, Persons, and Perception (22 January 2026)
According to one of the principal theories of time, time passes but, according to the other, it doesn’t. According to some theories of persons, our minds are identical with our brains and our brains operate in the manner of a computer but, according to other theories of persons, there is more to it than this. According to some theories of perception we are directly presented with mind-independent objects but, according to other theories of perception, some kind of intermediary object is involved. To set the scene for the coming seminars, the pertinent aspects of some of these various theories will be outlined.
2 Why some, but not all, accounts of Persons presuppose temporal passage (5 February 2026)
Some accounts of persons – for example, functionalist accounts – do not require that there is metaphysically real temporal passage. But, for some accounts of persons, such as Kant’s embodied consciousness account, metaphysically real temporal passage is, it will be argued, an essential prerequisite.
3 Why some, but not all, accounts of Perception presuppose temporal passage (26 February 2026)
Some accounts of perception – for example, representationalism – do not require that there is metaphysically real temporal passage. But, for some accounts of perception, such as direct realism, metaphysically real temporal passage is, it will be argued, an essential prerequisite.
4 Why the objective world (probably) lacks temporal passage (12 March 2026)
A number of important arguments tell against the notion of metaphysically real temporal passage. These arguments are to be found not only in philosophy, but also in physics – most notably, in the theory of relativity. And, it will be argued, the arguments are of sufficient weight to suggest that, however it might seem to us, the objective world lacks metaphysically real temporal passage.
5 The subjective temporal frame of reference (26 March 2026)
If the objective world lacks metaphysically real temporal passage, this would seem to work to the detriment of those accounts of persons, and of perception, for which metaphysically real temporal passage is, it has been argued, an essential prerequisite. However, building on the work of Ptolemy, Copernicus, Galileo and Gareth Evans in the spatial arena, the idea of an experiencing subject’s subjective temporal frame of reference will be introduced. Temporal passage can straightforwardly be depicted as obtaining relative to this subjective temporal frame of reference. In keeping with some accounts of persons, and of perception, such temporal passage is mere appearance. But, it will be argued, with reference to those accounts of persons, and of perception, which presuppose metaphysically real temporal passage, the subjective temporal frame of reference, and the temporal passage which obtains relative to it, can be shown to be parts of metaphysical reality. Consciousness, as it is characterised in terms of these accounts, therefore has an impact on how time is. The metaphysics of time, this is to say, is conditioned by the metaphysics of mind. Time and mind are, therefore, inter-defined. Time and mind form a local holism.
Contact name: Keith Hossack
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